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IN THE SUPREME COURT 





JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 





BRIEF Q~F RESPONDENT 
STATE1fENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from what was denominated a 
habeas corpus proceeding, (see Supplemental Record, 
page 32 and Transcript, page 39, line 30- page 40, line 
1) which was held in the Second Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah in and for Weber County, the Hon-
orable Parley E. N orseth presiding. On December 24, 
1962, the proceeding was held pursuant to Rule 65B (f) ( 1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. At the close of the hear-
ing an order was issued by the Honorable Parley E. Nor-
seth re-sentencing plaintiff, Bernard Lawrence Alexan-
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der, to ''serve not more than five years in the state peni-
tentiary." (Tr. 47, line 1-2) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff was re-sentenced by order of the Honorable 
Parley E. N orseth at the conclusion of the hearing to 
serve not more than five years in the state penitentiary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this honorable court to affirm 
the action of the lower court in re-sentencing plaintiff-
appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 18, 1961, Bernard Lawrence Alexander, 
appellant herein, pleaded guilty to an amended informa-
tion which alleged that defendant had issued a check 
against insufficient funds in violation of Section 76-20-11, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Laws of Utah 
1955. This statute provides : 
''Any person who * * * wilfully, with intent 
to defraud, makes or draws or utters or delivers 
any check, * • • for the payment of money, know-
ing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, 
or delivering that the maker or drawer or the 
corporation has not sufficient funds in, or credit 
with said bank • • • for the payment of such 
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checks, draft, or order, in full upon its presen-
tation, although no express representation is made 
with reference thereto, is punishable by imprison-
ment in the counly ja.il for not more than one year, 
or in the state prison for not more than five 
years.'' (Emphasis added) 
Pursuant to the plea, and after the investigation by 
the Adult Probation Department for pre-sentence report, 
on December 26, 1961, appellant was sentenced by the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist as follows : 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED, that the said Ber-
nard Lawrence Alexander be sentenced to impris-
onment in the Utah State Prison for a term of 
not to exceed one year, the last four years of the 
'not to exceed 5 years' contemplated by the statute 
is hereby suspended as an act of mercy because of 
the great injustices that were suffered by the 
defendant in the past, said sentence to begin as of 
December 26, 1961." (Tr. 22) 
Defendant was forthwith committed to the Utah State 
Penitentiary. 
By letter, dated November 29, 1962, appellant wrote 
to Judge Wahlquist, asking the judge to intervene on ap-
pellant's behalf with the Board of Pardons and take what 
action was necessary so that defendant would achieve 
his release on or about December 26th, at the end of the 
one year term. On December 19, 1962, the Attorney Gen-
eral filed with the District Court for the Second Judicial 
District for Weber County a motion to modify the sen-
tence of appellant on the ground that the original sen-
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tence was erroneous. After a full hearing, in which 
appellant was represented by competent counsel, Judge 
Parley E. Nor seth issued an order of re-judgment and 
re-sentence on December 27, 1962, pursuant to the hearing 
which was denominated either a hearing on a writ of 
habeas corpus or writ of coram nobis, wherein appellant 
was sentenced for a term ''not to exceed five years.'' 
The order of commitment specified, ''This sentence from 
date of original incarceration in the Utah State Prison. 
Dated-Dec. 26, 1961." (Tr. 29) 
On February 25, 1963, appellant filed a notice of ap-
peal. On March 4, 1963, the Supreme Court on its own 
motion entered an order of dismissal on the grounds that 
it was untimely. Upon motion of counsel, who now rep-
resent appellant, the appeal was subsequently reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Responsive to Appellant's Point IV) 
A. THE APPEAL WAS UNTI1IELY BE-
CAUSE IT WAS FRO:.\I A HABEAS CORPUS 
ACTION AND A HABEAS CORPUS ACTION 
IS A CIVIL ~fATTER; THEREFORE, AP-
PEAL MUST BE TAKEN "\VITHI~ O~E 
:MONTH AFTER THE EXTRY OF JUDG-
MENT. 
B. APPELLANT HAD NO RIGHT TO COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL, AS THIS IS A CIVIL 
:MATTER WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
JUNCTIONS REQUIRING REPRESENTA-
TION BY COUNSEL ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
4 
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A. It is a well established princi pie of jurisprudence 
in this state that a habeas corpus proceeding is civil in 
character. See TVinnovich v. Emery, 33 U. 345, 93 P. 
988 (1908); State v. Kelsey, 64 U. 377, 231 P. 122 (1924). 
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is therefore, 
controlling on the time allowed for an appeal in ciYil 
cases. It provides as follows : 
''PROCEDURE FOR TAKING AN APPEAL 
'' (a) WHEN AND How TAKEN. When an appeal 
is permitted from a district court to the Supreme 
Court, the time within 'vhich an appeal may be 
taken shall be one month from the entry of the 
judgment appealed from unless a shorter time is 
provided by law, except that upon a showing of ex-
cusable neglect based on a failure of a party to 
learn of the entry of the judgment the district 
court in any action may extend the time for appeal 
not exceeding one month from the expiration of 
the original time herein prescribed.'' 
The judgment in the habeas corpus action, from 
which Alexander appeals, was entered December 27, 
1962. (See Tr. 29.) Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, further provides as follows: 
"A party may appeal from a judgment by fil-
ing with the district court a notice of appeal, to-
gether with sufficient copies thereof for mailing 
to the Supreme Court and all other parties to the 
judgment, and depositing therewith the fee re-
quired for docketing the appeal in the Supreme 
Court.'' 
The notice of appeal in this case was not filed in the 
district court until February 20, 1963 (Tr. Suppl.). 
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Appellant states in his brief: 
''The question is not whether this was in whole 
or in part a habeas corpus or coram nobis pro-
ceeding, but whether it comes within the scope of 
the statute authorizing appeals in criminal mat-
ters." (Brief of Appellant, p. 35.) 
He then goes on to cite Section 77-39-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, which pertains to appeals in criminal matters. 
It is strongly urged by appellee that his contention in this 
regard is totally inapplicable. The actual question is 
·whether or not this is a criminal or a civil matter. N oth-
ing could be more clear in the Record than that this was 
treated and denominated as a writ of habeas corpus 
by the court which heard it. (See Record 39, Line 28; 
Record 40, Line 4.) It is obvious, therefore, that since 
4.t was denominated and treated by the court as such, and 
since the court certainly has the absolute power and au-
thority to characterize the action in any manner it deems 
fit, as long as the characterization could not be regarded 
as arbitrary or capricious, the only question then is 
whether or not it is a criminal or civil matter. In light 
of the above cited authorities, there is no doubt but that 
it is a civil matter and it follows that appellant had one 
month in which to file his appeal. Not having done so, 
his failure to file notice of appeal within one month is 
fatal to the appeal and the time allowed for criminal 
appeals could not be more immaterial to the question of 
the timeliness of appellant's action herein. 
B. Appellant cites Article I, Section 12, of the 
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Utah Constitution. It is appropriate to point out that 
this provision applies to criminal prosecutions ex-
clusively: 
''In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel. • • •." (Emphasis added) 
In support of the proposition that reversible error 
was committed in failure of the state court to appoint 
counsel on appeal for Alexander, appellant cites Douglas 
v. California ...... U. S ....... , ...... S. Ct ....... , 9 L. Ed. 811 
(1963). This case stands for the single proposition-and 
is limited thereto-that denial of counsel on appeal from 
a criminal conviction is a transgression of the equal pro-
tection clause embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution. (2) The opinion is by its 
terms limited : 
"We are not here concerned with problems 
that might arise from the denial of counsel for 
the preparation of a petition for discretionary 
or mandatory review beyond the stage in the a p-
pellate process at which the claims have once been 
presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an 
appellate court. We are dealing only with the 
first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich 
and poor alike (Cal. Penal Code 881235, 1237), 
from a criminal conviction." (Emphasis added) 
It can readily be apprehended that (1) since the in-
stant matter involves a habeas corpus proceeding and, 
therefore, is a civil action, and (2) since the Douglas 
case is limited to the situation where there is a direct 
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appeal from a judgment in a criminal case, the doctrine 
announced therein is inapplicable to the facts at hand. 
A revealing statement is found on page 126 of 
Reaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts: 
''In surveying the proceedings in which there 
might be a need for counsel, it is ohdous that one 
can retain counsel to appear in civil cases, but 
that unless a specific statute allows the public 
defender or other counsel to be appointed for indi-
gents, there is no right to receive appointed coun-
sel in civil cases. Since habeas corpus is regarded 
by the courts as a civil procedure, there is no right 
to receive a,ppointed counsel in this proceeding al-
though in a meritorious case courts generally will 
make appointments." (Emphasis added) 
The case of People ex rel Ross v Ragen, 391 TIL 419, 
63 N.E. 2d 874 (1945), discusses the question in detail. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, to the argument that ap-
pellant's constitutional rights to counsel were Yiolated in 
a habeas corpus proceeding, stated: 
''By every constitutional and statutory provi-
sion, the right and duty of the court ot appoint 
counsel for indigent persons is limited to criminal 
prosecutions in which the accused is charged with 
crime. The purpose of the guarantee of the right 
to appear by counsel is to prevent an unjust con-
viction of the accused in a criminal prosecution 
instituted and carried on by the State. It has 
no application to a civil pro~eeding for a writ of 
habeas corpus, instituted for the purpose of the 
enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty. 
"In Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101, L.Ed. 
554, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall: 'It has 
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been demonstrated at the bar, that the question 
brought forward on a habeas corpus, is always 
distinct from that which is involved in the cause 
itself. The question whether the individual shall 
be imprisoned is always distinct from the question 
whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the 
charge on which he is to be tried, and therefore 
these questions are separated, and may be decided 
in different courts.' 
"In a later case, the Supreme Court of the 
United States said: 'The writ of habeas corpus is 
the remedy which the law gives for the enforce-
ment of the civil right of personal liberty. Resort 
to it sometimes becomes necessary, because of 
what is done to enforce laws, for the punishment 
of crimes; but the judicial proceeding under it is 
not to inquire into the criminal act which is com-
plained of, but into the right to liberty notwith-
standing the act. Proceedings to enforce civil 
rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for 
the punishment of crimes are criminal proceed-
ings. In the present case the petitioner is held un-
der criminal process. The prosecution against 
him is a criminal prosecution, but the writ of ha-
beas corpus which he has obtained is not a pro-
ceeding in that prosecution. On the contrary, it 
is a new suit brought by him to enforce a civil 
right, which he claims, as against those who are 
holding him in custody, under the criminal proc-
ess. If he fails to establish his right to his liberty, 
he may be detained for trial for the offense; but if 
he succeeds he must be discharged from custody. 
The proceeding is one instituted by himself for his 
liberty, not by the government to punish him 
for his crime.' Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 
2 S. Ct. 871, 872, 27 L. Ed. 826. 
''This being a case involving only the enforce-
ment of relator's civil right of personal liberty, 
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separate and distinct from the criminal proceed-
ing in which punishment for a crime was imposed 
upon him, he is not in the position of an 'accused' 
in a 'criminal prosecution.' The court is neither 
authorized nor empowered to appoint counsel to 
appear for him." 
In summary, since this action involves an appeal 
from a habeas corpus proceeding and since a habeas 
corpus matter is deemed to be civil, appellant had one 
month in which to file a notice of appeal, and he was 
not entitled constitutionally to appointment of an attor-
ney by the court; the appeal is therefore untimely and 
the other points in appellant's brief are improperly be-
fore the court. 
POINT II 
(Responsive to Appellant's Point I) 
THE RE-SENTENCE BY THE SECOND DIS-
TRICT COURT WAS WARRANTED AND IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE ESTABLISHED AND REIN-
FORCED BY THE PRECEDENTS IN UTAH 
LAW, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE ORIGI-
NAL SENTENCE WAS CORRECT AS TO 
TIME OR PLACE IS TOTALLY I~I:MATE­
RIAL BECAUSE INCORRECTNESS AS TO 
ONE ASPECT MAKES THE SENTENCE 
TOTALLY INCORRECT AND VOID AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
(a) THE ORIGINAL ERRONEOUS SEN-
TENCE BY JUDGE WAHLQUIST, COM-
MITTING APPELLANT TO ONE YEAR 
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(b) THE PROPER AND APPROPRIATE 
METHOD TO RECTIFY THE ERROR 
WHICH RESULTED IN A VOID SEN-
TENCE IS A RE-SENTENCING PRO-
CEDURE. 
(a) There can be no doubt that the Legislature has 
full authority to provide prisons and to determine where 
prisoners may be sent; and the courts have no discretion 
as to the place to which criminals may be committed ex-
cept as the Legislature gives it. Latimer v. Randolph, 
13 Ill.: 2d 552, 150 N.E. 2d 603 (1958). 
Appellant asserts in his brief that because of the 
wide discretion reposed in the sentencing court, which 
includes the power to choose between alternative sen-
tences, the power to suspend imposition of the sentence, 
the power to suspend execution of the sentence, and the 
power to impose conditions upon probation, the sentence, 
to a term not to exceed one year in the state penitentiary, 
was not void "but at most merely voidable as to the ex-
cess, particularly where, as here, the defendant has 
served the sentence without complaint or appeal.'' Ap-
pellant relies on the rule that a sentence which is 
excessive as to one element is a valid sentence hut that 
the excessive part is voidable. 
Appellant further argues that Judge Wahlquist's 
sentence was efficacious to the extent of the period of 
time established therein, and the fact that the sentence 
designated a place other than that authorized by the stat-
ute does not make the sentence void but only voidable as 
11 
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to the place of commitment. Plaintiff-appellant further 
contends that since the place of punishment actually 
designated was more onerous that that called for in the 
statute and since the time has actually been served, aud 
since the erroneous place designated was only voidable, 
the error as to place which was previously severable and 
thus subject to revision is also cured. Appellant evi-
dently concludes that the sentence, having been served, is 
no longer voidable and appellant should be discharged 
and that the re-sentencing was, therefore, error. 
In this regard respondent concedes the existence of 
the rule interposed by appellant but disputes its applica-
bility to the facts before the court in this case. 
It is submitted by respondent that the rule as to 
severability discussed by appellant is applicable only 
where a court sentences a prison to an authorized place 
of correction but exceeds the time established by la1c. In 
such instances it is recognized that the excess is void 
as to the excess. However, such is not the case where 
the place of imprisonment is not authorized by the ap-
plicable statute. 
In the instant matter the judge possessed two alter-
natives; not three or four. He could either sentence ap-
pellant (1) to a term not to exceed one year in the county 
jail, or (2) to a term in the state prison not to exceed five 
years. 
The action by Judge Wahlquist constituted an at-
12 
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tempt to take an avenue not open to him and whieh he 
knew was unavailable to him at the time by his own 
admission: 
"Suppose I sentence him to the State Prison 
for one year~ Not to exceed one year~ It might 
be an illegal sen.tence. If it is, the only thing they 
ean do is bring him back and I will resentence 
him.'' ( Tr. p. 27, Line 20-23) (Emphasis added) 
In attempting to impose a sentence not provided for by 
the statute, the court exceeded its jurisdiction as surely 
as if it had ordered appellant to serve the sentence at San 
Quentin or Leavenworth. 
Under appellant's reasoning, the judge could haYe 
imposed a sentence not to exceed five years in the county 
jail and since it was only wrong as to the place of impris-
onment and not void, appellant would have no right to a 
writ of habeas corpus because such writ is available only 
to test jurisdictional questions. When thus applied, the 
specious nature of appellant's analysis and reasoning is 
revealed. 
The true application of rule is stated in the venerable 
case of In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 
149 (1894), where petitioner was erroneously sentenced 
to a state penitentiary for a federal crime by the federal 
court. To the specific argument by the Federal Govern-
ment that the sentencing court did not exceed its juris-
diction by sentencing petitioner to an unauthorized place, 
the Federal Supreme Court said : 
"We are unable to agree with the learned coun-
sel, but are of opinion that in all cases where life 
13 
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or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court 
must keep strictly within the limits of the law au-
thorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the 
case and to render judgment. It cannot pass be-
yond those limits in any essential requirement in 
either stage of these proceedings; and its author-
ity in those particulars is not to be enlarged by 
any mere inferences from the law or doubtful con-
struction of its terms. There has been a great 
deal said and written, in many cases with em-
barrassing looseness of expression, as to the jur-
isdiction of the courts in criminal cases. From a 
somewhat extended examination of the authori-
ties we will venture to state some rule applicable 
to all of them, by which the jurisdiction as to any 
particular judgment of the court in such cases may 
be determined. It is plain that such court has 
jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only 
when the offence charged is within the class of 
offences placed by the law under its jurisdiction; 
and when, in taking custody of the accused, and in 
its modes of procedure to the determination of the 
question of his guilt or innocense, and in render-
ing judgment, the court keeps within the limita-
tions prescribed by the law, customary or statu-
tory. When the court goes out of these limitations, 
its action, to the extent of such excess, is void. 
Proceeding within these limitation.s, its action 
may be erroneous, but no void. 
'''"' • • When the jury have rendered their ver-
dict, the court has to pronounce the proper judg-
ment upon such verdict - and the law, in pre-
scribing the punishment, either as to the extent, 
or the mode, or the plaee of it, should be followed. 
If the court is authorized to impose imprison-
ment, and it exceeds the time prescribed by lQIU:, 
the judgment is void for the excess. If the law 
prescribes a place of imprisonment, the court COl»~ 
14 
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not direct a different place not au,thorized; it can-
not direct imprisonment in a penitentiary when 
the law assigns that institution for imprisonment 
under judgments of a different character. If the 
case be a capital one, and the punishment be death, 
it must be inflicted in the form prescribed by law. 
Although life is to be extinguished, it cannot he by 
any other mode. The proposition put forward by 
counsel that if the court has authority to inflict 
the punishment prescribed, its action is not void, 
though it pursues any form or mode which may 
comment itself to its discretion, is certa.inly not 
to be tolerated. Imprisonment might be accom-
panied with inconceivable misery and mental suf-
fering, by its solitary character or other attend-
ing circumstances. Death might be inflicted by 
torture, or by starvation, or by drawing and quar-
tering. All these modes, or any of them, would be 
permissible, if the doctrine asserted by him can 
be maintained. 
''A question of some difficulty arises, which 
has been disposed of in different ways, and that is 
as to the validity of a judgment which exceeds 
in its extent the duration of time prescribed by 
law. With many courts and judges - perhaps 
with the majority - such judgment is considered 
valid to the extent to which the law allowed it to 
be entered, and only void for the excess. Follow-
ing out this argument, it is further claimed that, 
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be in-
voked for the relief of a party until the time has 
expired to which the judgment should have been 
limited. But that question is only of speculative 
interest here, for there is here no question of ex-
cess of punishment. The prisoner is ordered to 
be confined in the penitentiary, where the law does 
not allow the court to send him for a single hour. 
To deny the writ of habeas corpus in such a case 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is a virtual suspension of it; and it should be con-
stantly borne in mind that the writ was intended 
as a protection of the citizen from encroachment 
upon his liberty from any source- equally as well 
from the unauthorized acts of courts and judges 
as the unauthorized acts of individuals. 
"The law of our country takes care, or should 
take care, that not the weight of a judge's finger 
shall fall upon any one except as specifically au-
thorized. A rigid adherence to this doctrine ·will 
give far greater security and safety to the citizen 
than permitting the exercise of an unlimited dis-
cretion on the part of the courts in the imposition 
of punishments as to their extent, or as to the 
mode or place of their execution, leaving the in-
jured party, in case of error, to the slow remedy 
of an appeal from the erroneous judgment or 
order, which, in most cases, would be unavailing to 
give relief." (Emphasis added) 
Folck v. Watson, 102 U. 470, 132 P. 2d 130 (1942), is 
a Utah case directly in point. It meets and disposes of 
appellant's argument that a sentence which is correct as 
to time but incorrect as to place of commitment is void-
able only to the extent that it is incorrect as to place of 
commitment. Appellant was con-..:icted in the City Court 
of Ogden City. On appeal appellant entered a plea of 
g-uilty in the District Court for \Yeber County to a 
charge of operating a motor -..:ehicle upon a public street 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in Yio-
lat.ion of an ordinance of Ogden City. The district judge 
sentenced appellant to be "imprisoned in the county jail 
of W cber County for 6 months, and the said defendant 
16 
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is ordered imprisoned in said county jail.'' The ordi-
nance under which appellant was convicted provided: 
''Any person convicted of a violation of this 
section shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
city jail for not less than 30 days nor more than 
six months. * * *." (Emphasis added) 
Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus In the 
District Court for Weber County and contended that the 
punishment imposed upon him was invalid in that the sen-
tencing court went beyond its jurisdiction in sentencing 
him to a place of confinement other than that provided for 
in the ordinance, to wit, the city jail. To this, the Su-
preme Court held : 
"* * *The contention is well founded. Where 
the law prescribed the place of imprisonment, the 
court is without jurisdiction to direct imprison-
ment elsewhere. Frankey v. Patten, 75 Utah 231, 
284 P. 318, and cases therein cited. 
"Weber County and Ogden City maintain 
jointly a building, two floors of which are deYoted 
to a jail. The City Jail is on the eleventh floor, 
the Cou;nty Jail on the twelfth floor, and many of 
the facilities employed in the care and detention of 
prisoners are common to both jails. This proceed-
ing is avowedly for the purpose of securing from 
this court an announcement of the respective du-
ties and obligations of the city and county in this 
so-called 'joint' jail and to secure a definition of 
the rights and powers of the officers in charge 
thereof. This court can pass only on questions 
presented to it involving actual controversies. The 
ralidity of the sentence prono~~nced, is here in-
volved, and nothing else. * * * 
17 
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"* • • [Folck] is entitled to be discharged 
from serving a sentence which is herein declared 
void, but as he plead guilty to the charge, and it 
is only the sentence and not the judgment of con-
viction which is void, it follows that the lower 
court still has jurisdiction to impose a proper sen~ 
tence." (Emphasis added) 
The court went on to cite Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 U. 245, 284 
P. 323 ,76 A.L.R. 460 (1929) and State v. Lee Lim, 79 U. 
68, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932), to the effect that the trial court 
has jurisdiction to impose a valid sentence because only 
a sentence is void and not the judgment of conviction. 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the District 
Court for Weber County, with directions to fix a date for 
pronouncing any sentence upon defendant in a form 
consistent with the views expressed in the opinion. 
The case of Frankey v. Patten, Sheriff, 75 U. 231, 
284 P. 318 (1929) stands for the same proposition that 
the Folck case does. Appellant was convicted of a vio-
lation of an ordinance of Salt Lake City and appealed to 
the district court. On trial de novo, he was again con-
victed and the district court issued the following 
sentence: 
''It is the judgment and sentence of this court 
that you, Peter Frankey, be confined in the county 
jail of Salt Lake county, state of Utah, for a pe-
riod of three months, which sentence will be sus-
pended upon your paying a fine of 299.00, which 
fine is hereby imposed upon you; and the sheriff of 
Salt Lake county, Utah, is charged with the exe-
cution of this order.'' 
18 
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Petitioner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging 
that the sentence imposed upon him was void and that the 
imprisonment in the county jail was in violation of the 
ordinance under which he was prosecuted and sentenced, 
and was unauthorized and, hence, his imprisonment and 
detention in the county jail by the sheriff. was unlawful. 
It was urged, specifically, by petitioner that the court was 
authorized to impose imprisonment only in the city jail 
and was unauthorized to order him to be imprisoned in 
the county jail. The court, to this contention said: 
'' * * * We think the contention is well founded. 
Where the law prescribes a place of imprison-
ment the court cannot direct a different place. To 
order that a person be imprisoned and confined in 
a place where the law does not allow the court to 
imprison him, said Mr. Justice Field in the case 
In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 258, 14 S. Ct. 323, 326, 38 
L. Ed. 149, is unauthorized, and 'to deny the writ 
of habeas corpus, in such a case, is a virtual sus-
pension of it.' To the same effect are also the 
cases of In re Mills, 15 U. S. 263, 10 S. Ct. 762, 34 
L. Ed. 107; Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St. 427, 83 
N. E. 608; Ex parte Davis, 42 S.D. 294, 174 N.W. 
7 41; Moulton v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 525, 102 
N.E. 689. The court being unauthorized. to order 
the imprisonment of the petitioner in the county 
jail, and the judgment in such particular void, the 
detention and imprisonment of the petitioner by 
the sheriff in the county jail is unlawful, and the 
petitioner entitled to be discharged therefrom. 
That is what he seeks by his petition, and holding 
as we do that his detention and imprisonment by 
the sheriff is unlawful, it is our bounden duty to 
discharge him therefrom.'' 
In speaking to the question of whether or not the erro-
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neous commitment renders the imprisonment entirely 
void, the court stated : 
"* * * [W] e believe 'the general rule is that 
if the detention complained of is not illegal, the 
court must remand the prisoner to the custody 
from which relief is sought ; if such custody is il-
legal, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged 
therefrom.' '' 
The court further stated in this regard : 
"However, 'Where the judgment or order di-
rects the imprisonment of a person in or at a 
place not provided by law and contrary to and in 
violation of law specifically prescribing the place 
of imprisonment, we think the correct rule is that 
such a direction or order is not mere error or an 
irregularity, but is, as in effect stated by ::\Ir. Jus-
tice Field, in Re Bonner, supra, an unauthorized 
act and beyond or without the jurisdiction of the 
cottrt, and, as stated, in Re Mills, supra, 'is not a 
case of mere error, but one in 1chich the court be-
low transcended its po?cers.' As \Yell call a direct-
ed or ordered imprisonment, for violation of an 
ordinance, in the state prison, or in the guard-
house at Ft. Douglas, mere error, or a defect, or 
an irregularity. The imprisonment here does not 
consist of some mere defect in the commitment is-
sued to the sheriff, for under no circumstances was 
the court authorized to deliver the petitioner to 
the sheriff or to commit him to his custody for im-
prisonment, any more than to rommit him to the 
custody of the warden of the state prison. X o 
valid order at any time could have been made by 
the district court, nor may it now make any, rom-
mitting the petitioner to the custody of the sher-
iff to be by him confined and imprisoned: hence 
the peti tiouer 's discharge from his imprisonment 
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and detention by the sheriff must be complete and 
absolute." (Emphasis added) 
The court further stated : 
'' * * * [ T] he court, in virtue of the section of 
the statute referred to, was not authorized to dis-
regard the place of imprisonment prescribed by 
the ordinance in question, and order the imprison-
ment of the petitioner elsewhere. When the city 
has prescribed a place of imprisonment, as here it 
specifically did by its ordinance, under which the 
petitioner was prosecuted and convicted, we see 
no more license or a.uthority of the the court to 
disregard such provision of the ordinarnce than to 
disregard any other provision of it." 
A case from another jurisdiction, which exactly 
parallels the instant matter, is People v. Kausch, 204 
.:\lise. 482, 126 N.Y. S. 2d 798 (1953). There, under New 
York law, appellant could have either been sentenced to 
the Elmira Reformatory for a period not to exceed five 
years or to a state prison for an indeterminate term, 
"the minimum of which shall be one day and the maxi-
mum of which shall be the duration of his natural life." 
Appellant was sentenced to the Elmira Rerformatory for 
au indeterminate term, the minimum to be not less than 
one day and the maximum to be the term of his natural 
life. The court ordered that the appellant be re-sen-
tenced, saying : 
''To sum the matter up, the sentencing judge 
could have sentenced the defendant to an indeter-
minate sentence in a penitentiary or state prison 
for a period not to exceed five years, or sentenced 
him to not less than one day nor more than his 
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natural life in a prison or penitentiary, or Elmira 
Reformatory, to be there confined under the pro-
visions of law relating to that institution. 
"It is therefore judged that the sentence im-
posed on this defendant is incorrect and I di-
rect that defendant be returned to this court for 
resentence.'' 
Attention is further called to David v. Reidrnan, _____ _ 
N.D.------, 114 N.W. 2d 881 (1962), wherein petitioner was 
mistakenly sentenced to one year in the state penitentiary 
instead of the county jail for one year. The North Da-
kota Supreme Court applied the universally accepted rule 
to the effect that : 
"Where the law prescribed a place for imprison-
ment, the court may not direct a different place, 
and if the court does so the sentence is void * * *." 
(Emphasis added) 
Ex parte Burden, 92 Miss. 14, 45 So. 1 (1907), also 
spoke directly to the argument raised by petitioner in this 
case, where it said: 
"* * * The distinction, abundantly established by 
authority, is between a sentence which is merely 
excessive or erroneous, regard being had to the 
particular offense, and a sentence which is abso-
lutely void. In the former case the writ of habeas 
corpus cannot be availed of, but party must ap-
peal; else the writ of habeas corpus would be made 
to serve the office intended exclusively for an 
appeal.'' 
Since the Utah court in Folck v. Tr atson, supra, and 
Fra;nkey 1'. Patten, supra, granted habeas corpus, implicit 
in the holdings is that sentence to the wrong place of 
confinement renders the sentence totally void. See also In 
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Re Mills, 135 U.S. 263,10 S. Ct. 762,34 L. Ed.107 (1890); 
People ex rel Wright v. Klein, 139 Misc. 353, 248 N. Y. S. 
2d 478; Mathes v. United Sta.tes, 254 F. 2d 938 (1958), 
where sentence does not comply with letter of criminal 
statute, it is not only erroneous, it is totally void. State 
v. Dooley, 14 Wash. 2d 459, 128 P. 2d 486 (1942), where 
the law provides a place of imprisonment, the court can-
not direct a different place and if it does so, the sen-
tence is void. 
State v. Thoma.s, 81 Ariz. 124, 302 P. 2d 261 (1956), 
where appellant was committed to the state prison on a 
conviction wherein the statute prescribed incarceration 
in the county jail, it was held by the Arizona Supreme 
Court: 
'' * * * When the statute prescribes imprison-
ment in the county jail the court has no jurisdic-
tion to impose a sentence in the state prison and 
his action in attempting to do so is void.'' 
(b) Where an erroneously void sentence is meted 
out, a resentencing procedure, wherein the prisoner is 
brought again before the trial court which passed the 
original sentence, is the correct manner in which to 
rectify the original defective penalty. Such a procedure 
finds sanction in the subsisting authorities of this state. 
The State respectfully calls the attention of this 
court to the case of Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 U. 245, 284 P. 
323 (1929), where the district court mistakenly sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate term. The law at that time 
provided that a determinate sentence must be established 
for the crime of which defendant was convicted. 
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"* * * We are confronted with a situation 
where the validity of the conviction is conceded 
but ·where the sentence is void." 
The court adopted the language and principles applied 
in numerous cases cited to the effect that : 
''If the sentence is valid in part and void in 
part, and the two are not sererable, or if it is 
wholly void because not such as the court u·as au-
thorized to impose, the prisoner will be remanded 
for the imposition of a lawful sentence. (Citing 
authorities.) (Emphasis added) 
"In that case the relator was remanded to the 
custody of the ·warden of the state prison, to be 
taken before the district court for the imposition 
of a lawful sentence nunc pro tunc. The practice 
that seems to have been generally adopted by the 
courts is thus stated in 29 C. J. at page 175: 
'' 'Where the conviction is ,~alid, but the judg-
ment and sentnece is unauthorized, the prisoner 
will be remanded to the custody of the proper 
officer in order that further proceedings may be 
had according to law, or the discharge may be de-
layed fo ra reasonable time to permit of further 
proceedings.' '' 
The court went on to state that unless the sentencing 
court had lost jurisdiction by lapse of time or by some 
act of the petitioner, it had jurisdiction to entertain a mo-
tion and to enter an order pursuant to such motion ren-
dering a correct sentence. It is obvious, in this case, that 
the Second District Court for Weber County had juris-
diction to re-sentence plaintiff-appellant, because he in-
voked the jurisdiction of that court himself. This method 
of handling such cases gains sanction in the cases of 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Prankey v. Patten, supra, where petitioner in habeas 
corpus was denied release ''to abide ·further order of the 
court in which he was legally convicted,'' and Folck v. 
Jr atson, supra, where, upon ascertaining that a void sen-
tence had been rendered, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the court from where it originated "with 
directions to proceed to fix a date for pronouncing any 
sentence upon defendant in form with views herein ex-
pressed.'' See also State ex rel Gladden v. Kelly, 213 
Ore. 197, 324 P. 2d 486 (1958); Richardson v. Harnd, 782 
Kan. 326, 320 P. 2d 837 (1958) ; Sta.te v. Culver, 23 N. J. 
495, 129 A. 2d 715 (1957), where it was held that the 
power in county court to punish criminals includes the 
power to correct the sentences imposed by it; Applica-
tion of Robinson, 142 Cal. App. 484, 298 P. 2d 656 (1956) ; 
People v. K ousch, supra. 
POINT III 
(Responsive to Appellant's Point II) 
JUDGE NORSETH, IN RE-SENTENCING AP-
PELLANT, WAS ACTING WITHIN THE AU-
THORITY AND DISCRETION GRANTED 
HIM BY THE STATUTES, AND THERE IS 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR COMMITTED IN 
IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF ZERO TO FIVE 
YEARS IN THE STATE PRISON, FOR HE 
WAS NOT BOUND TO HONOR THE INTENT 
OF THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE ORIGI-
NAL VOID ORDER OF PUNISHMENT. 
The original judge, Judge Wahlquist, did not choose 
to hear the writ of habeas corpus and on his own motion 
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disqualified himself because he apparently felt that he 
could not approach the questions raised without bias, as 
he was the judge who imposed the original sentence. Cer-
tainly, it would not be appropriate for a judge who was 
alleged to have, and by his own admission, committed an 
error to be sitting ii judgment in an action wherein the 
alleged error is brought into question and where he may, 
perhaps, be called upon to alter a ruling made by him-
self on the basis that the original ruling was mistaken. 
Obviously, Judge Norseth could not give effect to an 
intent of the original judge which would haYc brought 
about an illegal result. At the re-sentencing hearing, 
Judge N orseth had exactly the same alternatives before 
him as did Judge Wahlquist: (1) Imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than one year, or (2) imprison-
ment in the state prison for not more than fiye years. 
Judge N orseth possessed all the material pertinent to the 
punishment as did Judge Wahlquist in the original action 
of Alexander and he was entirely within his discretion in 
levying a punishment of from zero to five years in the 
state prison. 
It is perhaps superfluous to mention that since the 
original sentence was absolutely void because it was in 
excess of Judge Wahlquist's jurisdiction to impose, 
Judge N orseth approached the sentencing as though it 
were an absolutely new proceeding, untainted by previous 
mistakes. The fact that he chose to sentence appellant 
to a lawful sentence to the penitentiary, and that his 
choice in this matter was different than Judge Wahl-
quist's is incidental. 
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The respondent submits that appellant's comments 
in this regard should be properly addressed to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge and not as a point of law on 
appeal. 
POINT IV 
(Responsive to Appellant's Point III) 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY JUDGE 
NORSETH DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY CON-
STITUTIONAL INJUNCTION BECAUSE A 
CORRECTION OF A VOID PUNISHMENT 
ONLY AFFECTS THE SENTENCE AND 
DOES NOT GO TO THE QUESTION OF CON-
VICTION. 
The double jeopardy argument was raised in Mathes 
v. United States, 254 F. 2d 938 (9th Cir. 1958), where 
after an erroneous sentence was corrected by a re-sen-
tencing procedure as in the instant case. The court there 
stated: 
"It is well settled that a sentence which does 
not comply with the letter of the criminal statutes 
is not only erroneous but void. Where such an er-
roneous sentence is imposed by the trial court, it 
may be corrected in conformity with the provi-
sions of the Statute, and the Appellant would not 
be placed in double jeopardy by so correcting it.'' 
This contention was also recognized in the case of United 
States v. Bozza, 155 F. 2d 592, aff'd. 330 U. S. 160, 67 S. 
Ct. 645, 91 L. Ed. 818. It was therein stated: 
"Appellant now contends that because he had 
begun service of his sentence, the trial judge 
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lacked the power to increase his punishment by 
adding the fines and penalties. It is true that a 
judge is powerless to add to a sentence once valid-
ily imposed after the prisoner had begun to serve 
it. This is upon the ground that to increase the 
penalty is to subject the defendant to double 
punishment for the same offense in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment to the [Federal] Constitution 
which provides that no person shall be 'subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb.' (Citing cases.) 
" 'However, it is '"ell settled that the imposi-
tion of a sentence at variance with the statutory 
requirements is a void act.' Such a sentence may 
be superseded by a new sentence in conformity 
with the provisions of the statute. It is no hin-
drance that the correction - even when it en-
tails a greater punishment - occurs after a sen-
tence has been partially served or even after the 
term of court has expired. (Citing cases.) These 
authorities are dispositive of appellant's reli-
ance on the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and thus are distinguishable be-
cause, here, the trial judge rorrected the erro-
neous sentence on his own initiative. 
" 'Double jeopardy' is a plastir concept. Its 
application has never been immutably fixed 
either at common law or under the protective 
bill of rights. (Citing cases.) Uncorrected, the 
court's action was violative of congressional will. 
(Citing cases.) Corrected, it merely imposed 
upon the defendant the penalt)~ fixed by Act of 
Congress. This is neither double jeopardy nor 
double punishment. We see no constitutional hin-
dranre to the court's action. (Citing cases.) ~r e 
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conclude that the sentence. as amended by the 
court below, was valid and operative.'' 
It might be additionally observed that the federal 
double jeopardy clause embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment is not applicable to this case, Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 749, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937); 
and any construction of it by a federal court is only 
persuasive in state matters. The controlling provision 
is Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, which 
provides in part: 
'' * * * nor shall any person be twice put In 
jeopardy for the same offense.'' 
~Ioreover, the principle appears to be firmly established 
that where a defendant by habeas corpus causes a second 
sentence to be imposed upon himself, he will not be heard 
to claim twice in jeopardy. Ex parte Bauchard, 38 Cal. 
App. 441, 176 P. 692 (1918); Ex parte Jacobson, 38 Cal. 
App. 784, 176 P. 693 (1918); Ex parte Turek, 38 Cal. 784, 
176 P. 693 (1918). 
In summary, while there are no Utah cases in point, 
it can be seen that the established rule, buttressed by 
subsequent cases, is that re-sentence of a prisoner to 
cornform to the statutory provisions applicable does not 
Yiolate the double jeopardy provision of the state con-
stitution nor does nt violate the due process provisions 
of the state or federal constitutions. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted for the reasons set forth 
above ( 1) that this appeal should be dismissed because it 
is untimely and/or (2) the relief requested be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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